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INTRODUCTION
"Search by consent" is an investigative technique frequently
used by law enforcement officers where premises are protected
against unreasonable search by the fourth amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States. Properly made, such searches are
deemed reasonable and therefore in full accord with constitutional
requirements. The utility of this technique and the subtle dis-
tinctions which determine its legality require a familiarity with its
basic elements.
The starting point for a good understanding of consent searches
is the fact that although the law consistently approves of this
technique, when legal prerequisites are satisfied, it does not favor
it. The law prefers those searches made by search warrant, for the
intervention of a magistrate provides the greatest assurance the
officers acted in observance of the rights protected by the fourth
amendment. The warrant, lawfully issued only upon a finding of
probable cause by the neutral and detached magistrate, describes
the premises to be searched, shows when they may be searched, and
specifies the things that may be sought. Such limitations are not
as obvious in a search by consent, and, as a result, the tendency of
the courts is to require the searching officer to present convincing
proof that his conduct was reasonable throughout.
Proof of this nature is often difficult to provide because of the
scarcity of real evidence and the consequent necessity for primary
reliance upon testimonial persuasion. If the officer testifies that he
received a valid waiver and the person who allegedly gave the
consent denies it, the court must look to all the surrounding facts
in evidence to determine the issue. Where the facts are not suffi-
cient to make a reasonably convincing case of consent, the law
settles the dispute by incorporating a presumption favoring the
defendant.
The reasoning here is clear. A person consenting to a search
waives his constitutional right to be free from search without a
warrant or a lawful arrest to which the search is incidental. Since
this right is highly regarded, there is a legal presumption (where
the facts of the case leave any reasonable doubt) that the person
alleged to have consented, in fact, did not consent. As has been
said many times, the courts ". . . indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."'
Judicial reluctance to credit an alleged waiver of fundamental
rights does not call for a pessimistic approach to consent searches.
This method of search is upheld frequently where there is inquiry
into all the circumstances and an effort to mediate fairly between
the interest of society in effective law enforcement and the right
of the defendant to his privacy. The presumption against waiver
does call, however, for care and understanding in each attempt at
search by consent in order to satisfy the requirements of the law.
An officer preparing to search under this authority must take four
separate steps, each of which is summarized below and discussed
at greater length in the material which follows. The four steps
and the order in which they should be taken are:
First, determine whether the premises are such that they are
protected by the fourth amendment. Some areas, such as open
fields and public places, can be searched lawfully without consent,
search warrant, or a contemporaneous arrest therein, and any
incriminating evidence thus uncovered may be collected and used
by the prosecution.
Second, if the premises do enjoy the fourth amendment pro-
tection against unreasonable searches, identify the person lawfully
entitled to possession at this time. The privacy guaranteed by the
amendment is found in the right of possession, not in the legal
title to the premises.
Third, obtain from that person a voluntary waiver of the con-
stitutional rights declared in the fourth amendment. The consent
should specify the scope and intensity of the contemplated search.
Fourth, conduct the search within the limitations expressed or
implied in the consent.
SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
A. When Consent to Search is Required
If the officer has no search warrant and lacks authority to
make a lawful arrest to which a search of the premises could be
1. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). For recent decisions
applying this rule to consent situations see: Weed v. United States, 340
F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81
(9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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incident, a reasonable search for fruits, instrumentalities, contra-
band, and specific items of mere evidence requires consent if the
place is protected by the fourth amendment. The amendment
speaks of "houses," but this word is broadly defined to include any
enclosure used as a habitation, as a place of business, or as a place
to store personal effects. The protected "houses" include: private
dwellings;2 apartments;3  hotel rooms;4 boardinghouse rooms;5
guest rooms;6 offices;7 business buildings;8 and miscellaneous
places.
The right of privacy in premises used as a residence also ex-
tends to the curtilage, defined as:
The enclosed space of ground and buildings imme-
2. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); United States v.
Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), reh. denied, 322 U.S. 770 (1944); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965). Outbuildings located within
the curtilage enjoy the protection extended to the dwelling. United States
v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
3. Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 964 (1965); Walker v. Pepersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); Chan-
nel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
4. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), reh. denied, 386 U.S.
951 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jef-
fers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d
361 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964) (motel room); Hall v.
Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963).
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Cunningham v.
Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966); Haas v.
United States, 344 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Feguer, 302
F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962).
6. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Burge v. United
States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); Wood-
ard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
930 (1958). Also see later discussion under "Guests."
7. Burnham v. United States, 297 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1961) (combined
place of business and home); United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); United States v. Zarra, 258 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Pa. 1966); United
States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Lagow,
66 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1946), reh. denied, 332 U.S. 785 (1947).
8. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (store); Beszutek v.
United States, 147 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1945); In re 14 East Seventeenth
Street, 65 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Maryland Baking Co.,
81 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
9. Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1965) (house trailer);
United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S.
906 (1963) (suitcase stored on premises of another); Holzhey v. United
States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955) (locked storage cabinet); United States
v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (desk used by employee); Strong v.
United States, 46 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1931), cert. granted, 283 U.S. 815
(1930), case dismissed, 284 U.S. 691 (1931) (barn).
diately surrounding a dwelling house . . . a space, neces-
sary and convenient and habitually used for the family
purposes, and the carrying on of domestic employments.
It includes the garden, if there be one, and it need not be
separated from other lands by fence. 10
As a general rule, the curtilage should be defined liberally,
giving a maximum of protection to the householder, and in the
absence of any other authority, a waiver of fourth amendment
rights therein (voluntary consent) should be obtained before com-
mencing a search of this property.
The privacy of surroundings, accepted as an integral part of
the use and enjoyment of the home, is not as significant a factor
where the premises are to be occupied only temporarily," or for
nonresidential purposes.12 These rules seem open to question, how-
ever, in any situation where the tenancy is for residential purposes
and for an extended time, or the business premises are fenced
or otherwise enclosed in any manner indicating an intention to
bar all unauthorized access.
B. Consent Not Required
The protections of the fourth amendment have not been ex-
tended to those areas of private property beyond the curtilage
described as "open fields"; therefore, consent to search such places
is unnecessary as there are no constitutional rights to be waived.'3
This is an important concept because, under the open fields doc-
trine, officers acting within the scope of their authority are not
prohibited from trespassing on such areas. Any information or
real evidence they can acquire in this manner may be used to
justify the issuance of a search warrant for the protected portion
of the premises or to justify an arrest. It may also be used as
direct evidence in a prosecution.
The most obvious application of the open fields doctrine occurs
where officers enter farmland, woods, or pastures related to a rural
dwelling. Though it is a technical trespass, the officers' presence
is not constitutionally prohibited, even where such areas are
surrounded by a boundary fence.' 4
Other places not protected under the fourth amendment and
which may be searched without obtaining consent are: unoccupied
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (4th ed. 1957).
11. Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 850 (1964) (motel room used by transients has no curtilage).
12. Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958) (business premises have no curtilage).
13. Hester v. United States, 256 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
14. United States v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See, also,
United States v. Young, 322 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
962 (1963); United States v. Benson, 299 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1962); Janney v.
United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 155
F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946).
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buildings;'15 abandoned dwellings;', and fields used for a commer-
cial enterprise, such as an open air nursery for plants and shrubs.'7
WHO IS LAWFULLY IN POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES
When the officer in charge of the search learns that the
premises are of a type protected by the fourth amendment, his next
step is to determine who is in lawful possession at this time. Note
that the key word here is "possession," not ownership. The fourth
amendment is not concerned with legal title to the premises; what
it guarantees is the right to possess one's home, office, or other
protected place free from unreasonable invasion by the govern-
ment.'8 The amendment does not provide absolute protection
against all searches but clearly prohibits only those stamped "un-
reasonable." When the need to search for the fruits, instrumental-
ities, contraband, or evidence of crime is compelling, a reasonable
search may be conducted provided only that the officers do not act
arbitrarily. They must submit their claims of probable cause to a
magistrate for testing, and, if found sufficient, a search of even the
most secluded premises may ensue. Though these constitutional
rights generated by the fourth amendment are personal and must
be claimed individually, the warrant directing an invasion of pro-
tected premises is not at all concerned with persons. The com-
mand is to"... search forthwith the place named for the property
specified. .. " It is not necessary for any person, other than the
officer, known or unknown, present or otherwise, to be involved in
order for the search to be reasonable. The search is literally
directed against certain premises reasonably believed to contain
items offensive to the law. In some cases, stolen goods may be
recovered from their hiding place in protected premises through
the medium of a reasonable search, and yet the identity of the
thief as well as that of the occupant of the premises may remain
completely unknown.
The law has not interpreted the fourth amendment warrant
requirement as being the only touchstone of reasonableness in
searching protected premises. Officers lawfully in a dwelling
incidental to a bona fide arrest therein have authority to conduct
15. United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 942 (1965), reh. denied, 381 U.S. 921 (1965).
16. United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Calif. 1963).
17. United States v. Sorce, 325 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 931 (1964).
18. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 768 (1926).
a reasonable search of the home (without a search warrant) to
uncover known fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the crime
charged. Their search authority is coextensive with the possession
or control exercised in the premises by the arrestee. This reason-
able search is not made any less so because the arrestee shares the
possessory right with his spouse, business partner, or other joint
occupant. Evidence discovered during the course of searching the
appropriately delimited area may be collected and is admissible
against anyone whom it may incriminate. Such a search may
well become unreasonable to the extent that the officers press
their examination of the premises beyond those areas clearly in
possession of the arrestee or which he occupies jointly, but, when
restrained to the areas so possessed or controlled, it is consistent
with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
Moreover, the law recognizes as reasonable those searches made
with the consent of one having possession of the specific place
against which a search is directed. Consent is the pass by which
the tollgates of fourth amendment restrictions are traversed. It
puts the officers lawfully on the premises and permits their search,
limited only by the bounds expressed in the consent and by the
physical extent of the area in present possession. Once again, the
fact that possession is held jointly is not fatal to the reasonableness
of the search, for in reality the one expressing consent does not
assume to speak as the alter ego of his cotenant. He speaks for
himself as one in possession. His invitation to the officers lawfully
commits the premises to their inspection, and, as this is deemed a
reasonable search for fourth amendment purposes, the results are
admissible in evidence not only against the consenting party him-
self but also against the contenant and anyone else.
The word "possession," in the fourth amendment sense, means
not actual physical occupancy but the legal right to occupy or
possess at this moment-the right to exclude others. Mere lawful
presence is not enough to establish a possessory interest, and
officers may not rely on the "apparent authority" of someone found
within to make the consent search reasonable. The test imposed
is whether consent was given by one having actual authority.19
A person remains in legal possession of his premises even while
temporarily residing elsewhere or absent because of business or
vacation travel.2 If the premises are to be searched by consent
during this interim, the authorization must be obtained from some
other person who exercises possessory authority as an agent for the
19. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Cipres v. United States,
343 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir. 1965); Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966).
20. Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Roberson
v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Brougher,
19 F.R.D. 79 (1956); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo.
1944).
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owner or who has equal possessory rights.
21
The problem of determining who has the possessory right to
the premises to be searched is not complex in all cases. For ex-
ample, if the accused is the only tenant of a hotel room, that room
is the place to be searched, and he is in the room when the officers
arrive, the problem is easily resolved. The accused is the person
entitled to possession, and he is there. His consent, and his only,
will permit a lawful search. But the relationship of human beings
to specific premises, and to each other, are subject to so many
variations that officers frequently encounter situations of far
greater difficulty. To obtain effective consent to search, the officer
must determine "who" can legally consent to "what." This can
best be understood by examining each of several relationships
which the accused (the person most likely to be incriminated by
the evidence sought) may have to protected premises and personal
property therein, that is, what he legally possesses and what he
does not.
POSSESSORY INTERESTS IN PARTICULAR
A. Owner
If the owner of the house, office, or other protected premises
to be searched enjoys the current right to possession and he is
physically present, his consent must be obtained. This rule applies
whether the search is to be made of the entire premises or of
specific suitcases, boxes, or other personal property located therein.
It is the fact of his possession which triggers the fourth amend-
ment protections and his physical presence which makes it manda-
tory for any waiver of his constitutional rights to come directly
from him.
A valid consent to search given by the owner-possessor-occu-
pant is effective against himself and any third person who has no
possessory right in the premises. Evidence collected during the
course of such a search may be used against the third party as well
as the person giving consent because the exclusionary rule is
inoperative where either there was no fourth amendment right at
the time of search or such rights as existed at that time were
effectively waived.
If the owner-possessor is not physically present when a search
is desired, authorization may be obtained from any other person
21. See later discussions of "Partner," "Husband and Wife," "Agent,"
and "Joint Tenants and Common Occupants."
having the requisite capacity to permit a search of the protected
premises. In some cases this may be a partner, spouse, agent or
joint occupant.
Where the owner of the premises to be searched is not entitled
to immediate possession, he cannot give a consent valid against all
other persons. He can, of course, waive whatever interest he has
remaining in the premises, but, lacking the current right of pos-
session, his consent is not effective against one who does have such
right. A common example is that of the house, apartment, hotel
room, office, or business building which the owner has rented to a
tenant. Some officers, in cases in which the tenant was the
accused, have made the mistake of searching the premises by con-
sent of the owner during a temporary absence of the tenant.
Searches of this kind are unreasonable. 22  The owner is not the
one in possession and his consent is not valid against the current
tenant. His right, as landlord, to enter the premises to inspect for
misuse, or to do housekeeping or other maintenance work, does
not extend so far as to allow him to authorize officers to search the
tenant's home for their purposes.
Occasionally the owner of premises will lease them to a tenant
except for some part, such as a bedroom in which he lives or a room
for storing his property. The owner possesses that reserved room,
and in his capacity as the lawful possessor he can consent to a
search of it. Evidence found in that room can be used against the
owner, or against any third person having no possessory right
therein, such as the tenant of the remainder of the premises.
The owner may consent where the present exclusive possessory
interest of his tenant is terminated and he regains the right to
immediate possession. For example, if a tenant has abandoned the
premises, the owner or landlord may repossess and thereby acquire
the legal capacity to consent.2  This rule applies even where
abandonment occurs prior to the time the rental period is up.
24
Similarly, the landlord may give consent to search following
termination of the tenant's right to possession where there is formal
eviction for nonpayment of rent;25 or, where the landlord termi-
22. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), reh. denied, 377 U.S. 940
(1964) (hotel room); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (house);
Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968
(1966) (rented room in private home); United States v. Burke, 215 F.
Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 849 (1964), reh. denied, 380 U.S. 927 (1965) (rented room in room-
inghouse).
23. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), reh. denied, 362 U.S.
984 (1960), Frank v. United States, 347 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. dis-
missed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965).
24. Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 872 (1962).
25. Paroutian v. United States, 319 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 981 (1964).
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nates a tenancy-at-will; 26 or otherwise asserts his right to regain
possession.27 But the right to possession remains in the tenant,
even though the rent is unpaid, where there is an agreement to that
effect2 8 or where the landlord has not yet repossessed the prem-
ises.29 The "landlord-tenant" relationship is no bar to a search by
voluntary consent of the landlord where the premises are being
used by both in a conspiracy to violate the law. The law will look
to the real relationship of the parties and where, as a part of a
conspiracy, both have a current right to possession, either may
give a vivid consent to search good against the other.30
The owner or other occupant having the current right to pos-
session of the premises has the capacity to consent to a search for
the purpose of locating and removing property stored on his
premises by a trespasser. Perhaps the best example of such a
situation is found in Cutting v. United States,5 1 where information
was received that an electric range stolen from the Government
was stored in a small building located immediately to the rear of a
private house. The owner gave voluntary consent, and it was held
that the range, found during the course of the authorized search,
was good evidence against a third party accused of the crime.
8 2
B. Tenant
"Tenant" is broadly defined to include one who, by express or
implied agreement, acquires possession but not ownership of a
ranch, farm, business building, office, house, apartment, room or
other place regardless of the duration of the contract. As long as
the occupant has the sole right to possess the premises, whether
it be by mutual agreement or simply until the owner orders him to
leave, he, and he alone has the legal capacity to consent to a search
of those premises that would be good against himself. If he con-
sents, any evidence of crime uncovered can be used against him
26. United States v. Fause, 242 F. Supp. 574 (D. Mass. 1965).
27. United States v. Cudia, 346 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 955 (1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 1021 (1965).
28. United States v. Olsen, 245 F. Supp. 641 (D. Mont. 1965).
29. Smith v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1965); Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
30. Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nom. Castaldi v. United States, 384 U.S. 944. Compare United
States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Cudia, 346
F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965), reh. denied, 382
U.S. 1021 (1965).
31. Cutting v. United States, 169 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1948).
32. See also, Von Eichelberger v. United States, 252 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1958); United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961). Com-
pare Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
and against any other person having no immediate possessory right
to the leased premises or the things found therein.
If the tenant is not physically present or is otherwise unavail-
able, a consent search directed against his premises cannot be made
unless the officers are able to obtain consent from someone else
lawfully exercising the possessory right in the premises. Here, the
owner is not authorized to consent. He surrendered his right of
possession when he agreed to the tenancy and retained no implied
authority to waive the tenant's constitutional rights 3
The tenant of an office building, apartment house, or rooming
house may sublease parts of the premises, in which case the sub-
tenant assumes lawful possession of the portion leased solely to
him and only he can consent to a search of that area.
Close questions can arise as to the precise limits of the space
in lawful possession of the tenant. The general rule appears to be
that the tenant possesses only that part specifically described in
the lease or commonly understood from the circumstances to be
reserved for his exclusive use, for example, the interior of the
office, apartment, or hotel room bearing a certain number. Other
parts of the building used for the landlord's purposes alone and
those used by everyone in common (elevators, stairs, and hallways),
and not leased specifically to any tenant, remain in the possession
of the owner and can be searched on his consent.34 Note, however,
that by lease or other understanding the tenant may be allowed to
store his personal things in a basement locker or a cupboard stand-
ing in a public hallway. In this event the tenant also possesses
that specific place.3 5
The tenant, like the owner or landlord, 6 must exercise his
possessory interest in order to enjoy the fourth amendment pro-
tection. Should he give the premises over to the use of another,
he, not being in possession even though he pays the rent, is not pro-
tected.
3 7
C. Joint Tenants and Common Occupants
There are relatively few decisions on the search problem where
two or more persons (not husband and wife) jointly and equally
occupy a house, apartment, hotel room, or other premises and one
or more of them become suspects in a criminal investigation. The
law allows a search of the parts mutually possessed, effective
33. See later discussion of "Joint Occupants," "Partners," "Spouses,"
and "Agents."
34. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Marullo v. United
States, 328 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1964), reh. denied, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964).
35. Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Lumia, 36 F. Supp. 552 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
36. Thomas v. United States, 154 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1946).
37. Curry v. United States, 192 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1951).
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against all of the occupants, on consent given by one of them:
"One having equal authority over premises may authorize a search
of them." '  Such a search was upheld in Nelson v. California,3 9
where police officers were admitted to an apartment by a woman
living there with the appellant. She gave the officers consent to
search the premises, and in a cupboard they found evidence used
against the appellant at trial.40
In view of the dearth of authority, it must be assumed that
consent given by one common occupant is not effective against
another who is on the premises at the time and objects to the
search.41 Officers also should make sure that in searching on the
consent of one, in the absence of the others, they search only those
parts of the premises which he possesses independently and those
which he occupies in common. Areas reserved for exclusive use
by any or all of the others remain fully protected by the fourth
amendment. For example, if the premises contain two bedrooms
and one bath, with A and B occupying bedroom 1 only, and C and
D occupying bedroom 2 only, the consent of A to search the entire
premises is effective against A as to both bedrooms and the bath.
He has waived all rights against search. It is effective against B as
to bedroom 1, which he jointly occupies with A, and the bath. It is
effective against C and D as to the bath, which is jointly occupied,
but not as to their bedroom, which they do not share with A.
Further, the consent of A alone, the others being absent, does not
allow a search of purely personal belongings (trunks, boxes, suit-
cases, etc.) of B, C, and D or of any separate closet, dresser drawer
or other privately occupied part of the premises.
4 2
The problem involved in cases of joint tenants and common
occupants is similar to that found in some other situations. 43
D. Partner
The general rule on partnership situations is that a valid con-
38. Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nom., Castaldi v. United States, 384 U.S. 964 (1966).
39. Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 964 (1965).
40. See also Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1961) (as
to entry only); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied sub nom., Skally v. United States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
41. See Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1965); Tompkins v.
Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113 (1963).
42. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965); Holzhey v. United
States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
43. See the discussion under "Partners," "Spouses," and "Guests."
sent obtained from one partner allows a search of the jointly
occupied premises that is effective against all the members. "The
rule seems to be well established that where two persons have
equal rights to the use or occupation of premises, either may give
consent to search, and the evidence thus disclosed can be used
against either."'4' This rule applies to a search of partnership
financial records as well as to partnership premises, 5 and it
assumes that consent is received from a full partner. Consent ob-
tained from a silent partner, one who contributes money but has
no right to occupy the premises or participate in management of
the enterprise, would likely be held ineffective against the other
partners.
Even in the case of consent received from a full partner, the
search should be limited to those premises and that property which
the partners clearly possess in common. If the several partners
have separate desks and offices assigned to them individually, con-
sent of one partner only probably does not authorize search of the
desks and offices given over to the personal possession of the
others.
The consent search problem in partnership situations is sim-
ilar to that found in cases involving "Husband and Wife" and
"Joint Tenants and Common Occupants."4 6
E. Husband and Wife
Though, as indicated previously, there is general agreement
that persons in joint possession may independently consent to a
search of their mutual premises that is valid not only as to them-
selves but also as to each other, there has been some confusion
in the law when this principle was confronted by the case of a
husband and wife. The unexpressed difficulty which the early
courts appear to have recognized was the fact that married women
did not enjoy the same rights as men. It was clear that at least
insofar as the right to possess the premises was concerned a married
woman was living in her husband's house. Therefore, as the courts
indicated in cases such as Humes v. Taber,47 even though the wife
told the officers to "search to your hearts' content" for evidence
that would incriminate her husband, she had no implied authority
"to license a search of his house for stolen goods."48
The emancipation of women and their continuing demands for
equality in our society have had their effect, and in most juris-
dictions the law's reaction to this increased authority and respon-
sibility is to recognize the right of the wife to share in possession
44. United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1953).
45. United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
46. See the discussion and cases cited under those headings.
47. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850).
48. Id. at 472.
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and control of the mutually enjoyed property. Still, such deep-
rooted notions do not easily vanish. A case reported in 1951
announced that a wife could not waive her spouse's immunity from
an unlawful search and seizure in her husband's home.
49
Another infirmity of searches authorized by consent of the wife
is the tradition of diligently safeguarding the rights of women and
others believed to be in need of special protection against coercion
or undue influence. In this regard, the courts have been alert to
detect any indication that the consent allegedly obtained from
the wife was involuntarily given. The balance of those reported
cases which have refused to accept evidence obtained during a
search authorized only by the alleged consent of the wife has been
decided on a finding that in fact or in law she gave no voluntary
consent. The leading case in this group is Amos v. United States,50
the only decision so far in which the Supreme Court has considered
the interspousal consent question. It was disposed of on the
grounds that the wife's consent was the product of coercion and
therefore ineffective to waive fourth amendment protections. The
Court gave no indication that it would deny the right of a wife to
permit a search of premises she possessed jointly with her hus-
band.5 '
While it is incorrect to say that marriage confers authority to
waive the constitutional rights of one's spouse, it is equally im-
proper to assume that the marital status deprives a spouse of the
right to permit a search of the premises solely or jointly possessed.
49. Simmons v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. Repts. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951).
50. Amos v. United States, 225 U.S. 313 (1921).
51. For other cases in this category see: Foster v. United States, 281
F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1960) (consent by wife, manager of tavern, to search
back room, but evidence insufficient to establish conclusively a waiver,
citing Amos); Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (citing
Amos); Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930) (property sur-
rendered in response to a search warrant and not voluntarily); United
States v. Rykowski, 267 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920) (officers read search war-
rant [invalid] to wife and she merely acquiesced); State v. Pina, 94 Ariz.
243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963) (search by search warrant a 3 P.M. found nothing;
officers returned at 7 P.M., told wife they were going to "renew" the search,
and they were admitted without further protest); Sheftall v. Zipperer, 66
S.E. 253 (Ga. 1909) (no consent); Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d
421 (Ky. 1959) (officer went to subject's home, demanded of the wife the
location of clothing worn during the murder, and said ". . . if you don't
tell me I'll hold you both as accessories to murder.. .. "); Maupin v. State,
38 Okla. Crim. Repts. 241, 260 P. 92 (1927) (officers acting under invalid
search warrant advised wife they wanted to search the premises and she
said, "Go ahead."); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709
(1963) (following arrest of husband, officers told wife falsely he had ad-
mitted crime and sent them for the "stuff" [loot]).
For example, in State v. Cairo,52 the wife permitted a search of the
cellar of a house and store owned jointly and the results were
binding on her husband because she was not acting as an agent for
him but in her own right. The court said if she had not been
related to her husband no question of her right would arise. "In
our opinion her mere relationship to one defendant as his wife
would not as a matter of law destroy that right which was personal
to her.
'53
In all of the reported cases which refused to accept evidence
collected under the authority of a spouse's consent, not one was
found which held that a spouse in joint possession and who gave
truly voluntary consent could not authorize a search that would
be binding on the other spouse.
A few cases refuse to recognize the authority of the wife's con-
sent when personal effects in the sole possession of the husband
were involved. This is entirely consistent with the theory that the
wife's right to permit a search comes from her right to joint pos-
session of the place or thing to be searched and not from the marital
relation per se. For example, in Dalton v. State,54 officers investi-
gating a hit-and-run offense asked the wife for consent to search
the suspect automobile, which was registered in her name. The
car, however, was paid for by the husband, who had sole control
and possession of it. The wife had never driven a car. In view of
her lack of possession, the court held that the wife could not consent
to a search of the car which was her husband's personal "effect,"
protected by the fourth amendment. Similarly, in State v. Evans,55
a husband's cuff link case in a bedroom dresser drawer was held to
be in possession of the husband alone, and his wife could not
authorize a search of it. However, even though the item searched
and seized is a personal effect of the husband, the wife may consent
where she has acquired lawful possession, such as luggage used on
a trip,56 or property left unprotected in an area which she jointly
possesses. 57
The importance of the current right to possession of the
specific place to be searched is clearly illustrated in the one case in
which the husband's consent was held to be ineffective against the
wife. The husband signed an agreement to permit a consent search
of his residence at any time as a condition of his release on proba-
tion. The house that was searched was in the sole possession of the
wife. She was paying for it and operating it as a boardinghouse.
52. State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948).
53. Id. at 847.
54. Dalton v. State, 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952).
55. State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962).
56. United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 868 (1951).
57. United States v. Roberts, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 980 (1965).
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The husband was present very seldom and in fact was living else-
where at the time of the search because his wife had instituted
divorce proceedings. The court held the search could not have been
authorized by the husband under the conditions prescribed. 58
There are numerous cases which provide support for the prop-
osition that either spouse may authorize a valid search as long as
he or she enjoys the right to joint possession of the place or thing
to be searched and effectively consents. 9
It has not been considered necessary for the officers to deter-
mine whether the premises are owned or rented in the name of
58. People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W. 797 (1928).
59 For a survey of the decisions applying this principle see: Nelson
v. People, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (consent by commonlaw wife); United
States v. Ball, 344 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Roberts, 332
F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 980 (1965); United States
v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951);
Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
844 (1948); United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945) (wife's
consent authorized search of main family dwelling and vacant second house
on the premises); United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945); Driskill v. United States, 281 F. 146 (9th
Cir. 1922) (wife consented to search of family garage); United States v.
Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass. 1948), aff'd, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S, 939 (1950), reh. denied, 341 U.S. 907 (1950); United
States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); People v. Carter, 48 Cal.
2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) (in upholding the wife's consent in a murder
case the court said where ". . . the property seized is of a kind over which
the wife normally exercises as much control as the husband, it is reasonable
to conclude that she is in a position to consent to a search and seizure of
property in their home."); People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. App. 2d 63, 300
P.2d 194 (1956); Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Florida 1962) (mistress
consented to search of their hotel room); People v. Palmer, 31 Ill. 2d 58,
198 N.E.2d 839 (1964); People v. Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578
(1958) (wife consented to search of family house trailer); People v. Sham-
bley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); State v. Shepard, 255 Iowa 1218,
124 N.W.2d 712 (1964) (husband's consent to search rented apartment valid
against wife in search for murdered newborn infant); Bellam v. State, 233
Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964) (wife's consent authorized search under tread
of stairway to second floor in home); State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208
A.2d 322 (1965) (wife's consent to search family cars parked in yard up-
held); Jones v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 358, 177 P.2d 148 (1946) (husband's
consent to search of home for evidence against wife authorized search
of cookie jar on shelf in a closet); Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 276, 142 P.2d
558 (1914); Joslin v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 161, 305 S.W.2d 351 (1957);
Padilla v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 618, 273 S.W.2d 889 (1954); Cass v. State,
124 Tex. Crim. 208, 61 S.W.2d 500 (1933) (wife's consent to search home
upheld, the court adding that there was no question of a waiver of the
husband's constitutional right, instead, the question was whether the con-
sent of the wife made the search reasonable); Bannister v. State, 112 Tex.
Crim. 552, 15 S.W.2d 629 (1929) (invalid, crippled husband consented to
search of family home for illegal liquor; evidence admissible to charge wife
with possession for purpose of sale).
one spouse or both. As pointed out earlier,60 the right protected
by the fourth amendment concerns the privacy enjoyed by the
possessor and today it is beyond dispute that in the usual marriage
situation the spouses equally possess their residence in general.
Search on consent of one spouse only should not go beyond those
premises and things which the spouses possess in common or which
are possessed in particular by the consenting spouse.
Though the case law is not sufficiently developed to describe
a broad general rule, it appears that consent of one spouse alone
should not be relied upon to authorize forcible entry and search
over the objections of the other spouse who is present on the
premises at the time.
6 '
In cases where one spouse is a business agent or partner of the
other, the authority of the former is controlled by the rules for
"Agent" or "Partner," discussed elsewhere.6 2  But no agency or
partnership authority to consent to search can be implied from the
marital relationship alone . 3 For example, where one part of the
family dwelling was reserved for the conduct of the husband's
business, the wife's consent to search of that part was not effective
against her husband.6 4
The consent search problem in cases involving spouses is sim-
ilar to that in cases of "Partner" and "Joint Tenants and Common
Occupants."' 5
F. Parent and Child
There is considerable authority for the view that a parent may
give consent to search, effective against his child, for a bedroom or
other part of the parent's premises occupied by the dependent child.
That such a search is reasonable in the law is illustrated by the
case of a 21-year-old son who shared a bedroom with two brothers
in the home of their parents. After the son was arrested for rape,
an officer went to the home, told the mother of the charge, and
said he wanted to obtain the coat worn by the son at the time of
the alleged crime. The mother led the officer to the son's bedroom
closet and allowed him to take the specified clothing. The search
was upheld.68
60. See p. 46 supra.
61. For a discussion of this problem in the context of a common occu-
pant (not husband-wife) case, see Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d
65, 378 P.2d 113 (1963).
62. See p. 55 supra and 62 infra.
63. United States v. Derman, 66 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
64. United States v. Rykowski, 267 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
65. See p. 54 supra.
66. Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964), aff'd,
348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965), reh. denied,
382 U.S. 1000 (1965); see, also, Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965);
United States ex rel. McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
affd, 342 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857 (1965); United
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What may be a good statement of the general rule appears in
State v. Kinderman, a state case where the court said, in part:
We can agree that the father's 'house' may also be that
of the child, but if a man's house is still his castle in which
his rights are superior to the state, those rights should also
be superior to the rights of children who live in his house.
We cannot agree that a child, whether he be dependent
or emancipated (defendant was 22 years of age at the time
of his arrest), has the same constitutional rights of privacy
in the family home which he might have in a rented hotel
room.
67
As in Kinderman, the federal cases have thus far failed to
draw a distinction on the age of the child. A child who has been
emancipated, whether by reaching the age of 21 or otherwise (as by
marriage), and who pays a regular rental for his room in the usual
commercial manner, should be considered a tenant in possession of
the room.68
Cases which appear to be decided contrary to the general rule
generally fall into either of two categories: no consent was actu-
ally obtained from the parent due to coercion or ignorance of con-
stitutional rights,6 9 or the parent expressing consent was not the
person in possession of the premises,70 and therefore lacked the
legal capacity to authorize a search.
In regard to the capacity of children to authorize a valid con-
sent search of the parents' premises, an application of the general
rule expressed above would preclude the existence of any such
capacity except as to areas in which the child has been granted
an exclusive right to privacy. Where the premises are not solely
those of the parent but are in the possession of the parent and child
jointly under an agreement to divide the right to possession, the
rules concerning joint tenants and common occupants would apply.
Where other relatives are involved, the controlling question
remains: Does the consenting party have the right to immediate
possession of the premises to be searched? The answer will, of
course, depend upon the arrangement between the pertinent
parties. Relatives, like nonrelatives, may have the status of owner,
landlord, tenant, joint tenant, common occupant, guest or visitor,
States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963);
United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 849 (D. Md. 1961).
67. State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1965)
(search on consent of the father was upheld).
68. See discussion on "Owner" and "Tenant."
69. E.g., United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. 478 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
70. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
and the fact of their family relationship is immaterial to the valid-
ity of a waiver of constitutional rights.
G. Agent
The person having the right to possession may appoint another
to act in the premises as his agent for a special purpose or for all
purposes. The agent thereby may exercise a right to limited pos-
session or full possession of the premises, according to the terms of
his agency. His capacity to consent depends upon the extent to
which he has been given the right to possession and authority to
act for his principal, and, where such capacity exists, the agent's
consent permits a search which is binding upon his principal as
well as himself.71
The question as to whether the person being asked to give
consent has the agency status and, if so, the extent of his authority
"may often be a matter of grave dispute. '7 2 If such a person is
only an employee, he lacks the general authority necessary to con-
sent to a search valid against the employer. 73 But an employee
who is also authorized to act in an agency capacity may be entitled
to give consent. For example, where the president of a corporation
consented to a search of corporate property for goods imported in
violation of the customs laws, the search was upheld as lawful and
his consent was binding upon the corporation.
74
Officers seeking to obtain a valid consent to search business
premises should always make the request of the highest ranking
employee or business representative. In United States v. Maryland
Baking Co.,75 a baking plant manager, in charge of all of the plant
operations, also acted in the capacity of representative of members
of a partnership which owned the plant but took no part in the
management of the business. The manager had never granted the
foreman or superintendent authority to admit anyone to the plant.
Under these circumstances a consent to search the plant premises
furnished by the foreman was held invalid as to the partnership
and as to the manager personally. The court indicated that as long
as the manager was present on the premises, she was the person
from whom consent should have been obtained.
71. Raine v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266
U.S. 611 (1924) (arrestee left farm under general control of one from whom
valid consent was obtained). See, also, Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1945) (superintendent's voluntary consent to search cellar of
apartment building valid against owner).
72. Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1945).
73. United States v. Ruffner, 51 F.2d 579 (D. Md. 1931) (consent ob-
tained from a person found operating a still in a farm building held invalid
against the owner because there was no proof that the consenting party
was an agent rather than a mere employee on the premises).
74. In re 14 East Seventeenth Street, 65 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1933).
75. See United States v. Maryland Baking Co., 81 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.
Ga. 1948).
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In regard to searches of company business records, consent
should be obtained from the person authorized to have sole control
of the office and of the records,70 or, from one who can act as an
agent for the company.77 Some evidence of an agent's apparent
authority and right to possession of the premises may be found in
the extent of his proprietary interest in his principal's business.
78
H. Employee-Employer
A mere employee, having no agency relationship or other spe-
cial authority, has no right to possession of the premises and there-
fore cannot authorize a search by consent.
79
The employer's authority in the employment premises is much
broader of course, but it is not unlimited. He may consent to a
search of those parts of the premises which he occupies exclusively
and of those parts to which he allows employees nonexclusive
access.80 But, where there are areas set aside for an employee's
exclusive use, such as a particular section of an office desk, a locker
or other receptacle of personal property, the employer may not
consent.8 1
76. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946), reh. denied, 329 U.S. 826 (1946)
(consent of the office manager sufficient).
77. Ansell v. United States, 352 U.S. 969 (1920) (corporate officers);
United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied sub nom., Peel v. United States, 316 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied sub nom., Crane v. United States, 375 U.S. 896 (1963) (secre-
tary-treasurer); United States v. Culber, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D. Md. 1963)
(president).
78. Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 161
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947) (consent obtained
from the general manager entitled to 50 per cent of the profits).
79. For examples of such invalid consent searches see: Cunningham v.
Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966) (house-
keeper consented to search of home); Hinchcliff v. Clarke, 230 F. Supp. 91
(N.D. Ohio 1936) (accountants having possession of taxpayer's business
records for limited purposes did not have apparent authority to consent to
search or seizure good against the owners); Ford v. Kelley, 223 F. Supp. 684
(D. Mass. 1963), appeal dismissed, 334 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1964); United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962) (handyman consented to search of basement of store); United
States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (secretary could not
consent to search of employer's files); United States v. Lagow, 66 F.
Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), af'fd, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 858 (1946), reh. denied, 332 U.S. 785 (1947) (clerk consented to
removal of company business records).
80. State ex rel. Davis v. Algood, 256 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. La. 1966).
81. United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (civilian em-
ployee's desk); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1966), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966) (soldier's locked desk). See also, Villano v.
United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962) (office desk).
I. Custodian
When the container or the other thing to be searched is now
in the lawful custody of someone other than the owner, many
courts hold that a valid search may be conducted on the consent of
the custodian.
1. Custody by Agreement
An agreement, expressed or implied, to create a bailment or
merely to make a loan controls the extent to the custodian's rights
over the property. The owner may grant full control, in which
case the custodian apparently has the capacity to consent to a
search.8 2 But when control is limited, for example, to mere cus-
tody for storage purposes with rights of access specifically denied,
the custodian may not consent.8 3
2. Custody by Operation of Law
Where the law transfers custody from the owner to another,
consent to search may be obtained from the one holding the prop-
erty legally.84
3. Custody Without Agreement
Property hidden by a trespasser is subject to search by consent
of the one in possession of the premises.8 5 The trespasser is not
entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment in premises he
has invaded.8 6
82. Sartain v. United States, 303 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 894 (1962) (consent by one given locked briefcase and key);
United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962) (friend consented to
search of trunk of borrowed car). See also, Von Eichelberger v. United
States, 252 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1958); United States v. Walker, 190 F.2d 481
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951), reh. denied, 342 U.S. 899
(1952); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); In re 14
East Seventeenth Street, 65 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1933).
83. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (package
entrusted to airlines only for shipment). The Corngold case overruled
Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1010 (1966), in which search by consent had been upheld where the
custodian was given an unlocked briefcase and instructed not to deliver it
to anyone else; Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 955) (locked
cabinet in storage on premises of another).
84. Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966) (search of
books and records of bankrupt companies consented to by trustee);
Springer v. United States, 340 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419 (D. Md. 1963) (consent by receiver); United
States v. Cowan, 37 F.R.D. 215 (1963) (baggage left in hotel room retained
under a statutory lien for unpaid room rent subject to search by consent
of management).
85. Cutting v. United States, 169 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1948) (property
stolen by A found in building on B's premises during search by consent
of B).
86. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). See also, Fisher
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4. Custody of Abandoned Property
Consent may be obtained from one who has recovered aban-
doned property.
87
J. Host and Guest or Visitor
A guest or visitor, lawfully present, has a constitutional right
to object to an unreasonable search of the premises when the fruits
of the search are to be used against him.88 But this does not answer
the question commonly posed in such cases: whether a voluntary
consent to search, given by the host in possession of the premises,
is effective against the guest or visitor.
The generally recognized rule declares that the host's waiver
of the constitutional protection afforded his premises is effective
against a guest or visitor. For example, a woman who was the
tenant in possession of an apartment, consisting of two bedrooms,
living room, kitchen, bath, and porch, gave the officers consent to
search the apartment. In the bathroom the officers found evidence
against the defendant, who, for several days past, had been, and
still was, a guest of the tenant in that apartment. The search was
held reasonable.89
The statement of the general rule assumes a guest or visitor
whose presence is casual only-a stay of a few days or a week or so
at most. The question becomes more difficult in those cases in
which the "guest" or "visitor" stays for a longer and indefinite
term, as when an aging or impoverished relative or friend is
allowed to live on the premises more or less permanently but
without paying rent. It has been held that a guest of this type has
the same possessory right in the room and furnishings given over
v. United States, 324 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 377 U.S. 999
(1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 873 (1964); United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp.
849 (D. Md. 1961).
87. Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 872 (1962) (abandoned in rented room); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960) (property abandoned in hotel room by former tenant);
United States ex rel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa.
1963) (abandoned in room in private home).
88. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States ex reZ.
Eastman v. Fay, 225 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) rev'd on other grounds,
333 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 954 (1965).
89. Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 829 (1965). See also, Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1961) (as to entry only); Fredrickson v. United States, 266 F.2d 463
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958); Calhoun v. United States, 172 F.2d 457
(5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949); Milyonico v. United
States, 53 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 551 (1931).
to his use that a tenant has in a rented room." Other decisions,
however, disagree, appearing to hold that one who lives there by
permission only acquires no right of possession in the premises,
with the result that the possessor's consent to search is as effective
against the permanent guest or visitor as against the temporary
one.
01
In the case of either a casual or permanent guest or visitor,
it would seem that the consent of the party possessing the premises
would be effective against the guest only as to the premises them-
selves, including the room occupied by the guest, but it would not
authorize the officers to search the personal property of the guest
without his consent. It was so held in Holzhey v. United States.
9 2
Such a rule is consistent with the decisions cited under "Partner"
and "Husband and Wife," in which it was held that the consent of
one spouse or partner to a search of the premises jointly possessed
does not extend to the property and things which the other spouse
or partner has an exclusive right to possess. But in Woodard V.
United States,93 the officers searched the room occupied by two
guests and in a coat they found a gun, of which the host previously
had advised them, and in a box of clothing which the host had
given to the guests, they found certain papers. The court upheld
the search, mentioning the host-guest relationship and stating that
exceptional circumstances (dangerous instrumentalities) justified
the search.
When the guest or visitor abandons the premises and leaves
personal property therein, he loses all rights as to both and they
may be searched on the consent of the host in possession.
9 4
Citation of authority hardly seems necessary to prove that the
consent of the guest to search the house or apartment in which he
is temporarily located is not effective against the host. A guest
acquires no possessory right in the premises generally which would
supersede the right of his host. But a court holding that a per-
manent guest acquires the possessory right to his room, as in
Reeves v. Warden,95 could logically hold that the guest's consent to
90. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965). See also, Hol-
zhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1955).
91. United States ex rel. McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1964), aJf'd, 342 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857 (1965);
Maxwell v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 325
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 1000
(1965); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965).
92. Holzhey v. United States, 223 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
93. Woodard v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 930 (1958).
94. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (hotel room); United
States ex tel. Puntari v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (pri-
vate home). See also, Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1965) (private
home); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 872 (1962) (rented room).
95. Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1965).
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a search of that room would be effective against the host.
In some of the guest cases cited, the guest is the adult child of
the host. See the discussion under "Parent and Child."
CONSENT: WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGiTS
A. Advice of Fourth Amendment Rights
An expression of consent is no authority for a lawful search
without a warrant unless it is a waiver of constitutional rights.
Therefore, the consenter must be aware of the protections of the
fourth amendment and his consent must be given with the inten-
tion of waiving those rights. 6 As expressed by one court: "The
Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the
Fifth and Sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each serves the
same purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ignorant
may surrender their rights more readily than the shrewd." 7
To insure that these standards are met, some courts would
require that the individual be clearly advised of that which he is
being requested to waive." Others, including the highest courts
of two states, Nebraska in State v. Forney,99 and Kansas in State v.
McCarty,1 ° have indicated that warning of fourth amendment
rights will not be considered an essential prerequisite for a valid
consent until the Supreme Court of the United States expressly
declares such a rule. The United States Court of Military Appeals
has adopted the position that such advice is unnecessary to justify
a search by voluntary consent.10 1 This court, however, would re-
quire a prior warning where, in addition to consent, the subject is
requested to point out his locker or identify particular items of
property as his.10 2 Since the act of identification could be con-
sidered an incriminating statement, an advice of rights in those
instances appears more appropriate, but this issue is beyond the
fourth amendment problem involved in routine consent cases.
Though there is clear disagreement as to the present legal neces-
sity for an advice of rights, the law unquestionably requires the
prosecution to bear the burden of proof that any consent claimed
was given with knowledge.103
96. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Wren v. United States,
352 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 944 (1966).
97. United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
98. Id.; United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
99. State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967).
100. State v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967).
101. United States v. Insani, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 519 (1959).
102. A.C.M.S.-22319, Guggenheim, 37 C.M.R. 936 (Air Force Bd. Rev.
1967).
103. United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
Thus, until the Supreme Court settles this issue, the safer legal
course to insure the receipt of a competent and intentional waiver
is to give such advice. The statement should be limited to a brief
declaration of the fourth amendment protection against unreason-
able search and seizure. It should do no more than to indicate the
individual has a constitutional right not to have a search made of
his premises without a search warrant and that he has a right to
refuse to consent to such a search.
B. Express Waiver
As indicated by Miranda v. Arizona,04 the waiver of a con-
stitutional right is not to be lightly inferred. The prosecution must
prove an express waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights be-
fore it may introduce evidence obtained under circumstances that
otherwise would be violative of these amendments. No decision of
the Court has extended this requirement to fourth amendment
cases; however, the government does have to show that the con-
sent expressed the person's intention of waiving those constitu-
tional rights,10 5 and that it was voluntarily given. 106 It must be
positive and cannot be implied from the mere failure to protest
entry and search.
07
Though it is not mandatory, the most convincing evidence of
waiver is a signed and witnessed writing bearing a declaration that
the advice of rights was given, that it was understood, and that the
consent to search was intended as a waiver of fourth amendment
protections. Such proof is not absolute, however, and it must be
supplemented by testimony of the officers as to the circumstances
under which the document was executed.
VOLUNTARY CONSENT
A. In General
The most difficult question for the courts to decide in consent
search cases is whether the consent was truly voluntary. Their
views differ considerably. Some tend to doubt that any consent
given is genuinely voluntary unless accompanied by some specific
and unequivocal act of the accused indicating that he did intend to
consent, such as a contemporaneous confession or admission of
guilt. What is perhaps the strongest statement of this position is
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Cipres v. United States,
343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Fowler, 136 F. Supp. 926
(E.D. Tenn. 1954).
106. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
107. Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1958). See also,
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Williams v. United States,
263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Whiting v. Cavell,
244 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1004 (1966).
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found in Higgins v. United States,108 where the court expressed
the opinion that ". . . no sane man who denies his guilt would
actually be willing that policemen search his room for contraband
which is certain to be discovered."
A possible flaw in the Higgins reasoning, apparent in at least
those cases in which the object sought ". . . could easily have been
concealed .... ."101 is its failure to recognize the fact, known to all
experienced officers, that the criminal often is both quite clever
and quite confident that he can outwit the police. The proof is in
his selection of places in which to hide small items of loot, evidence
and contraband, such as the following: a trash can," 0 a washing
machine,"' between the back and the springs of an upholstered
chair, 112 in a towel rack on the back porch,113 in a carpet sweeper, 114
under the carpeting of a stairway, 1 5 in a hollow pencil or block of
wood, 116 and in a bird's nest in an awning just outside the apart-
ment window. 117 In light of facts such as these, it seems beyond
question that many a suspect who consented to a search of his
premises has watched the officers walk out without finding the
objects which he had hidden.
The Higgins dictum suffers, also, from the fact that some who
consent, and who appear to be quite sane enough to stand trial,
actually assist the officers in the search. 18 At any rate, the dictum
has been both specifically and impliedly rejected by other courts." 9
Some decisions have suggested reasons supporting a voluntary con-
sent by one who denies-or at least does not admit-his guilt. He
may give consent as a device to shift the culpability elsewhere,
2 0
or in the belief that anything found would be of no significance.'
2
108. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
109. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152 (1947).
110. Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960).
111. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Barrientes v. United
States, 235 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956).
112. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 912 (1959).
113. Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 916 (1959), reh. denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959).
114. United States v. Davis, 281 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 364 U.S. 505 (1960).
115. Williams v. United States, 260 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 359 U.S. 918 (1959).
116. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
117. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
118. See United States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1953); United
States v. Kubik, 266 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Iowa 1967).
119. See United States v. Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
120. United States v. DeVivo, 190 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
121. Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1967).
Consent may be a deliberate stratagem calculated to dispel the
suspicions of the officers, taken in the belief that the goods are too
well hidden to be found.122 Or, consent may be a stratagem




The burden of proof required of the prosecution includes the
necessity for clear and convincing evidence that consent was volun-
tarily given in circumstances free of duress. 124 The officer, though
acting in good faith, must be careful to avoid not only the use but
also the appearance of coercion.125 It is imperative that he consider
carefully each of the factors that may be influential in determining
the legal effectiveness of the consent obtained.
Some of these factors are:
1. Appropriate Time
At the outset, officers must, if possible, select an appropriate
hour to request consent. Timing is important to avoid even the
semblance of duress. In the usual residential situation the most
acceptable time is during the daylight hours.126 The courts have
criticized, as coercive, requests for consent made in the home after
dark. 121 However, where the urgency of the case demands it, con-
sent may be requested at any time. In regard to business premises,
used at night, a request for consent may be appropriate during the
actual business hours observed.
2. Number of Officers
The size of the group requesting consent should be the mini-
mum consistent with the safety of the officers. Evidence that they
appeared in such numbers as to constitute overwhelming force
tends to destroy the voluntariness of consent. For example, in a
narcotics case, a group of eleven officers approached a private
home. Five entered the premises and requested consent to search
122. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1958); Grice v.
United States, 146 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. Adelman, 107
F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939); Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 768 (1926); United States v. Martin, 176 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
123. See United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960).
124. United States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (1955).
125. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
126. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied sub noma., Edgar v. United States, 377 U.S. 970 (1964).
127. Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953) (after
midnight); United States v. Brennen, 251 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ohio 1966)
(after 5 A.M.); United States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (8:30 P.M. -9:15 P.M.); United States v. Roberts, 179 F. Supp. 478
(D.D.C. 1959) (close to midnight).
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while the remainder surrounded the house. The court held there
was no voluntary consent to search given, basing the decision in
part on the coercive effect of the presence of such a group in and
about the defendant's home.
128
3. Display of Weapons or Other Symbols of Authority
Officers seeking permission to search should avoid unnecessary
display of weapons, and should make their requests clearly inde-
pendent of the power and authority represented by the badge and
uniform. This does not prevent officers in full uniform from re-
questing consent.'29 It merely emphasizes the importance of ob-
taining a waiver of constitutional rights through a request rather
than through mere submission to the symbols of authority.
130
4. Approach to the Premises
Where the sole reason for approaching the premises is to solicit
a voluntary consent to search, officers should avoid unnecessary
appearance of force. The siren, the flashing red light, numbers of
officers or cars, all valid symbols of authority, are inappropriate
where the end to be gained must come voluntarily.
5. Announcement of Presence, Identity, Purpose
To preserve the balance between the privacy of the premises
and the authority to inquire, the officer should make known his
presence at the doorway, identify himself, declare his purpose and
request permission to enter. Without a favorable response, the
officer has no authority to proceed into the premises, but where
permission is granted he may enter.
Permission to enter is not permission to search. Whether ob-
tained at the door prior to entry or obtained during interview
following entry, consent to search must be independently requested
and specifically given.
128. Catalanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953).
129. United States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 384 U.S. 964 (1966); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771, 787,
n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
130. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (Dist. of
Col. 1963); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United
States v. Marquette, 271 F. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1920); United States v. Brennan,
251 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ohio 1966); Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550
(Md. 1965).
6. Language of the Request for Consent
The exact words chosen by the officer and their expression are
important in obtaining truly voluntary consent. The language
must convey a request, not a command. It serves the officer's
purpose best when it is complete but simple and direct, avoiding
intimidation by volume, inflection or ambiguous meaning.'
3'
7. Status or Condition of the One From Whom Consent
is Obtained
Law enforcement officers should remember that the courts will
be particularly alert to detect any evidence of duress in the case of
women, the very young, the very old, the foreign born and all
others for whom special consideration has been shown in the
past.
132
But, officers should not hesitate to make a bona fide request
for consent to search in such special cases. In Roberts v. United
States,"3 a police lieutenant and the chief, investigating a homicide
case, were dressed in plain clothes and used an unmarked car
when they visited the defendant's home and obtained his wife's
voluntary consent to search. In upholding the validity of the con-
sent search, the court commended the officers for the reasonable
manner in which they negotiated with the wife.
8. Custody
Where the person giving consent is in custody, the burden of
proving voluntariness becomes more formidable but not impossible.
It is here that the widest divergence of opinion appears among
various courts."' However, there appears to be general agreement
that arrest and custody are merely factors to be considered, among
others, in determining the voluntariness of consent. Of greater
importance are the particular circumstances under which the ar-
restee expressed his waiver."35 Even the fact that the arrest was
131. United States v. Brennan, 251 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
132. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1965); Waldron v. United States, 219
F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir.
1931); United States v. Wai Lau, 215 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), alf'd,
329 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 856 (1964); United States
v. Ong Goon Sing, 149 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
133. Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 980 (1965).
134. Compare United States v. Pate, 222 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1963),
aff'd, 332 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1963), with Tatum v. United States, 321 F.2d
219 (9th Cir. 1963).
135. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944); United States v. Hall,
348 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965); United States
v. Bracer, 342 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954 (1965);
Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965); Tatum v. United
States, 321 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81
Search of Premises by Consent
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
illegal is not necessarily fatal where the case presents a clear indica-
tion the express consent given was truly voluntary.8 6
C. No Fraud
Consent to search obtained by fraud is void and evidence
acquired as a result of such "consent" is subject to the exclusionary
rule as the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. Valid
consent cannot be obtained by advising falsely that a search warrant
is available "anyway," 1 7 by falsely implying that a threat of arrest
will be lifted as soon as consent is given, 3 by declaring that the
officer's purpose is to interview when his real purpose is to
search13 9 or by "conning.'
40
However, as long as there is no fraud or misrepresentation by
the officer and his identity and purpose are known to the person
having the capacity to consent, there is no duty to explain fully all
the possible legal consequences of consent and cooperation.
141
Similarly, some courts have held it is unnecessary for the officer to
declare all the items he hopes to locate in the premises as long as he
intends, in good faith, to search for the property he does specify in
his request for consent. For example, a consent search was valid
where the officers were given permission to search for item A but
unknown to the person giving consent, they intended to search for
items A and B.' 42 Presumably, the authority given to search for
item A would limit the officers to looking in those places where A
could reasonably be located and should they discover B in the
course of that search they would not have to close their eyes to it.
If it is the known fruit, instrumentality or other evidence of a
crime or per se contraband and therefore subject to seizure, it may
be taken. If not, specific consent will be required to remove it.
There would be no authority for an independent search for item B
(9th Cir. 1962); Armwood v. Pepersack, 244 F. Supp. 469 (D. Md. 1965),
aff'd, 359 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1966).
136. Burke v. United States, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 849 (1964), reh. denied, 380 U.S. 927 (1965).
137. Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), afl'd,
293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 392 (1962).
138. United States v. Como, 340 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1965).
139. Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963).
140. United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See
also, United States v. Ong Goon Sing, 149 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
141. Burnham v. United States, 297 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1961); Badger
Meter Manufacturing Co. v. Brennan, 216 F. Supp. 426 (ED. Wis. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 902 (1963).
142. United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 912 (1959).
either in places where A could not be located or after A had been
found.
Pretexts or other misrepresentations may be used for the
limited purpose of "getting the door open," but the officer must
present a bona fide request, including full disclosure of identity
and purpose, and obtain voluntary consent before commencing a
search.143 Where no search is intended and the objective is merely
to gain entry to talk with the occupant, the use of such investigative
techniques has been judicially approved.
14"
SPECIFIC CONSENT
A. Consent to Entry
Officers should carefully observe the distinction between an
invitation to enter and a consent to search the premises. Consent to
entry alone will not justify a search,145 but it can be a very use-
ful investigative tool, permitting a better atmosphere for the inter-
view and at least exposing the interior of the premises to the casual
scrutiny of the officer. 146 Less formality is required to obtain per-
mission to enter. "A policeman who identifies himself and his
purpose from the other side of a closed door has every reason to
assume that the act of unlocking and opening the door, without
more, is a consent to talk, and that the walking back into the room
is an implied invitation to conduct the talking inside. 147 Such
permission generally may be granted by any occupant lawfully on
the premises; for example, judicial approval has been given where
the invitation to enter was extended by the defendant in his own
premises, 148 by his mother-in-law, 14 by his child, 8 years of age,' 50
and by a joint tenant. 1' But where consent to entry is colored by
duress, it is unlawful.'
52
When lawful entry has been made into the premises, the
officer may observe whatever is in open view or what becomes
143. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied
sub nom., Edgar v. United States, 377 U.S. 970 (1964); United States v.
General Pharmacal Co., 205 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1962); United States v.
Martin, 176 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
144. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), reh. denied, 386 U.S.
939 (1967) (informant posed as narcotics purchaser); United States v. Lock-
lear, 237 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (officers posed as potential pur-
chasers of stolen property).
145. Commonwealth v. Painter, 368 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1966); Cunning-
ham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 (1966);
Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
146. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied
sub nom., Edgar v. United States, 377 U.S. 970 (1964).
147. Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1966).
148. United States v. Cachoian, 364 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1966).
149. United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966).
150. Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964).
151. Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1961).
152. Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963).
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apparent to him during the course of the interview because con-
sent to enter constitutes implied consent to observe that which is
in plain view. 158 His observations do not constitute a search and
any facts thus uncovered will be useful in building probable
cause.5 4 Similarly, the known fruits, instrumentalities, contra-
band and other evidence of a crime discovered in this manner may
be seized and, because there was no search, a search warrant is
unnecessary to authorize the seizure.
155
B. Unequivocal Expression of Consent
Voluntary consent to search must be clearly expressed. Plain
language will suffice in most instances, but it is not enough for
officers to "reasonably and in good faith" believe effective consent
has been given. The crucial question is whether the proper party
in fact voluntarily consented to the search.156 Therefore, it is
essential for the language of consent to be as free of ambiguity as
possible.
Such statements as "come on in,"'157 and "you are welcome to
go search the whole place,"' 5 shorn of their context, do not convey
a clear intention to permit a search without a search warrant. In
the first instance, the invitation may well be limited to mere entry
for purposes other than search and, in the second, there is no indi-
cation the speaker meant to permit an unwarranted search.
The language used ordinarily must be considered in light of the
facts of the situation for, as stated by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cipres v. United States: 
159
[A] waiver cannot be conclusively presumed from a verbal
expression of assent. The court must determine from all
the circumstances whether the verbal assent reflected an
understanding, uncoerced, and unequivocal election to
grant the officers a license which the person knows may
153. Chapman v. United States, 346 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965).
154. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied
sub nom., Edgar v. United States, 377 U.S. D70 (1964).
155. Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45 (lst Cir. 1966); Davis v.
United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); Ellison v. United States, 206
F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
156. Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 968 (1966); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965).
157. United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
158. Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
159. Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965).
be freely and effectively withheld. 60
Some facts to which the officer might testify in support of a
search by consent are:
The defendant himself first suggested the search; 16' the de-
fendant signed a written consent-to-search form after being advised
of his fourth amendment rights; 162 no printed form was available
but voluntary consent was recorded in writing; 16 3 the arrestee de-
clined to sign a written waiver but he explained, "You don't need
that, you got my permission;"'16 4 the defendant cooperated by fur-
nishing the key to unlock his house, 16
5 his apartment, 166 his car,167
or his personal effects; 66 the defendant specified the amount of
money or described goods that would be found and pinpointed their
location; 69 the defendant set the conditions under which the search
would be conducted by saying, ". . . I will only take two of you;'
170




Voluntary consent to search, being an expression of an individ-
ual's decision to waive his constitutional rights, is not necessarily a
total surrender to the will of the officer. Such limitations as the
person giving consent chooses to apply must be recognized. For
example, there may be specific restrictions as to who may conduct
the search; 172 how many men may assist; when the search may
begin and how long it may continue; the area of search; 7 3 and the
stated objective of the search.
174
From the officer's point of view, his request for consent should
be broad enough to insure a thorough search while at the same time
160. Id. at 97.
161. United States v. Simpson, 353 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 971 (1966).
162. United States v. Plata, 361 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1966); Ruud v.
United States, 347 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1014
(1965).
163. United States v. Hecht, 259 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
164. Burge v. United States, 342 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1965).
165. King v. Pinto, 256 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J. 1966).
166. United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1963).
167. Robinson v. United States, 325 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1964).
168. United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 906 (1963).
169. United States v. Torres, 354 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1966); Rice v.
Warden, 237 F. Supp. 463 (D. Md. 1964).
170. United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963).
171. United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 947 (1965); Grillo v. United States, 336 F.2d 211 (1st Cir. 1964),
cert. denied sub nom., Gorin v. United States, 379 U.S. 971 (1965).
172. Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1965).
173. United States v. Royster, 204 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
174. United States v. Guerrina, 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
Search of Premises by Consent
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it must be specific enough to clearly indicate who is going to con-
duct what kind of a search, where, and for what purpose. If the
officer wants to search only the room currently being occupied by
his subject, the consent obtained should specify that room. But if
he wants to search additional premises they must be identified also.
A clear understanding as to what is being requested and what
rights are being waived in response to that request will avoid much
difficulty in determining the legality of a search by consent.175
D. Revocation or Modification
Consent to search given voluntarily may be preseumed to con-
tinue, unless revoked, until all areas to be searched have been
examined. This is true even where the searching officers cannot
complete the search and must return the following day to
accomplish the task. However, once completed, a second search
should not be begun without further authority, such as new con-
sent, search warrant, or arrest on the premises.
176
A voluntary consent to search having been given without obli-
gation or consideration may be revoked if the intention to revoke is
expressed at any time prior to the completion of the search.
177
That part of the search which occurs prior to the revocation of
consent is an authorized search at the time it is executed and,
therefore, it is lawful. Evidence obtained thereby may be admis-
sible and should be retained. But that portion of the search which
occurs following the revocation of consent is executed without
authority and is therefore unlawful by definition. Logically, the
revocation of consent would appear to be merely a denial of a
further right to search. It cannot invalidate the authority
175. For some illustrative cases see: United States v. Smith, 308 F.2d
657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1963) (consent pertained only
to a specific suitcase stored on protected premises); Karwicki v. United
States, 55 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1932) (consent to search business premises did
not include consent to search residence located in rear portion of building);
Strong v. United States, 46 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1931) (consent to search a
barn did not extend to a root cellar nearby); United States v. Hopps, 215
F. Supp. 734 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 820 (1964) (consent to search file drawers for company business
papers did not authorize seizure of personal papers misfiled in the drawers,
or the search and seizure of other papers not belonging to the company
but found on top of desks and file cabinets other than those marked with
the company name).
176. See Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
177. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965). See also, United
States v. Bracer, 342 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 954
(1965).
previously given but it can terminate that authority.
The authority to search also may be expanded by consent. For
example, where one in lawful possession gives consent for officers
to search additional separate premises not named in the search
warrant, such consent authorizes an expansion of the area of lawful
search.178 Similarly, a voluntary consent to search particular
premises may be expanded by an expression of consent to search a
greater area and officers are entitled to search according to the
maximum extent intended.
CONCLUSION
In light of the swift currents of change running through the
criminal law today, it is imperative that basic investigative tech-
niques, such as the search by consent, be closely reexamined and
evaluated according to contemporary standards. There may be a
need for modification of the manner in which investigations are
conducted. If so, such change as is required by developing case law
and by legislation may be incorporated in training programs for
new officers and in amended instructions to veterans. But, even
where present investigative techniques are found to be fully con-
sistent with the law, there may well be room for improvement. It
would not be a unique experience for officers to find that there are
more lawful investigative alternatives available to them than they
are now utilizing.
As this study indicates, there are several important limitations
on the authority to conduct a search by consent, but it remains a
significant factor in the evidence-gathering process. The principle
that a man may waive a right guaranteed him under the Constitu-
tion has not been abrogated. The refinements in this area of the
law have come about chiefly due to concern as to the applicability
of the principle in circumstances where the nature of the waiver is
in doubt or where competency is an issue. There is no indication
that the complexity of proving the authority to search by consent
will diminish as the body of search and seizure law continues to
grow. Therefore, the utility of this technique will be limited
largely to those officers who understand its limitations and pre-
requisites and who call upon it with discretion.
178. Huhman v. United States, 42 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1930); Cantrell v.
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